This qualitative research investigates the growing social activism against the trend of desecularization within non-religious state education in Israel, employing a social movement framework. By conducting in-depth interviews with individuals engaged in this activism, the study examined the ideological frameworks of the actors, their perceived organizational structures for mobilization, and their view of political opportunities used to uphold secular principles in the Israeli educational system. The study contributes to social movement research by highlighting secular motivations, often overlooked in favor of faith-based activism, and addresses the limited literature on desecularization in public education. It also underscores the nonlinear progress of secularization and liberalism in Israel, noting a sense that the tendency toward desecularization has been gaining momentum in certain parts of society. This research enhances understanding of desecularization as a social movement in education and informs broader discussions on the intersections of religion, culture, and governance in democracies.

The first decade of the twenty-first century saw the rise of a phenomenon known as new atheism. In recent years the visibility of new atheism has waned, but scholarly research into the causes of this decline remain limited. This paper examines the rise and fall of new atheism within the broader context of the U.S. atheist movement. Employing the conceptual framework of the social movement lifecycle, the analysis shows how the trajectory of the movement was shaped by its internal organisational challenges as well as the wider political and cultural landscape. While the early atheist movement was able to leverage internet technology and effectively use ‘atheism’ as an empty signifier to thrive in a hostile environment, growing conflicts over the aims and direction of the movement, fuelled in part by the growth of identity politics as part of the wider culture wars, led to an increasingly bitter factionalism that drove the movement apart.

About a decade after the Arab Uprisings, the Tunisian Ennahda party experienced the exodus of several high-profile leaders. Motivated by the party’s growing factionalism and shrinking support, this article investigates the organizational factors that account for the low system-ness of an Islamist-born party following major organizational changes. It does so by drawing on interview data and organizational developments that unfolded inside Ennahda (2016–2021). In a framework that intersects the field of party politics and organization studies, this article argues that the major factors that account for Ennahda’s low system-ness include (i) an inefficient and inadequate theorization of the need for the party’s specialization in political activities, (ii) a problematic identification with the subsequently refashioned organizational identity, and (iii) an uneasy coexistence of distinct group identities involved in separate processes of organizational identity recrafting. This article concludes by challenging the way scholars traditionally conceive coherence, cohesion, and “change” in religious parties.

Individual religiosity is often discussed and at times found to be associated with anti-pluralistic attitudes and outgroup hostility, such as nativism. Yet, less is known about contextual factors like the strength and visibility of actors that instrumentalize religion to reinforce nativist sentiments. The most prominent actors in that regard are populist radical right parties (PRRPs) that politicize Christianity to promote their right-wing stances. I seek to address this gap by assessing whether PRRPs’ participation in government influences the impact of individual religiosity on nativism. I argue, first, that more religious Christians are likely to have a stronger tendency toward nativism and expect, second, that governing PRRPs reinforce this impact. The study analyzes 37 European and Latin American countries using data from the Joint EVS/WVS (2017–22). Results show that religiosity is indeed related to nativism. However, there is no evidence that PRRPs in power strengthen this religiosity–nativism nexus.

Faith-based organizations that are rooted in India’s diverse faiths give shape to their roles in an operational space shaped by the Hindu nationalist government. This paper, based on interviews with 34 FBOs, compares how FBOs rooted in five different faith traditions perceive that operational space, and how they relate to the state based on their perceptions of these conditions. One key finding is that there are important similarities in these FBOs’ perceptions and ways of responding. Another key finding is that ways of understanding and responses vary in ways that can be explained at least partly by the differentiated position of diverse faith communities in Indian society itself and the specific challenges faced by members of each faith tradition. That is, the specific context of marginalization or promotion of a religious community by the state positions FBOs to advance their objectives through collaboration, confrontation, or by keeping distant from state agencies.

Arguably, no subject has captured more attention in the study of American religion in recent years than “Christian nationalism”—a political theology that seeks a privileged place for Christianity in American public life. Social scientific inquiries into the causes and consequences of Christian nationalism have yielded much fruit in a relatively short period of time. Nevertheless, the literature tends to treat Christian nationalism as if it were a monolithic category, with all “Christian nationalists” being motivated by the same beliefs. In reality, Christian nationalists, although presumably seeking the same goal—namely the establishment of a Christian nation—are a diverse lot, motivated by very different, in some cases mutually exclusive, belief systems. This article attempts to remedy this oversight by exploring the divergent beliefs and theologies undergirding different forms of American Christian nationalism. Specifically, it delineates three main forms of Christian nationalism present in American public life: charismatic dominionism, Calvinist nationalism, and Catholic integralism. It explores what differentiates these different Christian nationalist movements and what they mean by and how they work together to bring about a Christian America.

Why does religion continue to emerge as a flashpoint in the age of secularization? Although models of religious resurgence suggest that religious cleavages are more prominent in the modern era, other models continue to show declining religious involvement. What is needed is a theory that can observe both resurgence and secularization at the same time. I argue that globalization—and the flow of people across borders, in particular—provokes a religious backlash at the societal level due to its secularizing effects. As the public is exposed to new and diverse religious traditions, religiosity declines; as a result, however, religious practitioners become more aggressive toward other religious groups. I test this theory using data on globalization, religious discrimination, and religious practice. I find that types of globalization dealing with the flow of people and information across borders have an outsize effect on societal religious discrimination, or SRD. This effect, however, is contingent on a decline in religious practice. This study suggests that religious resurgence can take place in secularizing environments, and that both resurgence and secularization share root causes.